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HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS:
A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT
SERVICES
Ryan Montefusco

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

The goal of the tort system can be reduced to one basic principle: the judiciary imposes legal responsibility on certain actors for
certain conduct in order to remedy past harms and influence prospective behavior. Over the course of its existence, our judiciary has
designated particular actors deserving of legal responsibility for various reasons. Guiding this imposition, however, is the will and perception of the general public. Because legal responsibility is attributed, in large part, on the basis of public perception, the community of
actors to which it applies will change in step with those interests and
activities that our society deems most important.
One of the most recent—and most dramatic—changes to our
tort system concerns the judiciary’s imposition of legal responsibility
on hospitals for the negligent conduct of independent contractor
physicians. The medical community’s ability to offer safe and effective healthcare services has improved significantly since the turn of
the twentieth century. Aided by advanced technologies, medical professionals are now more capable of providing local communities with
quality care. Through the eyes of the treated public, this development has been most clearly witnessed within the landscape of hospital
operations.
So influenced by the public recognition of hospitals as vessels for
medical treatment, such institutions have endeavored to distinguish
themselves in the healthcare field. This undertaking has been
marked by increased self-advertising and overall commercialization of
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1

the industry. Through the success of this practice, however, hospitals have observed both positive and negative consequences of
heightened public exposure. Despite benefiting institutions monetarily, the long-desired image of hospitals as complete-care institu2
tions has compelled social reliance. This, in turn, has given rise to
greater legal responsibility and resulted in expanded notions of liabil3
ity for negligent conduct born within hospital facilities.
Heightened expectations of accountability are most evident in
the judiciary’s recent assignment of liability to hospitals for the tor4
tious conduct of independent contractor physicians. Notwithstanding hospitals’ ostensible contractual delegation of liability, courts
have increasingly held hospitals liable for the negligent actions of in5
dependent contractor physicians. Though this accurately reflects societal expectations, the vehicle through which courts have apportioned fault is inconsistent with the underlying goals of the tort
system.
This Comment seeks to explore the evolution of hospital liability
as motivated by changes in societal expectations of the institution.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the impact of public policy on hospital liability for both employee and independent contractor physicians. Part III explains and criticizes the procedural methods presently used in apportioning fault to hospitals for the negligent
conduct of independent contractor physicians. Part IV of this Comment concludes that the imposition of anon-delegable duty to provide non-negligent support services on hospitals will realign current
schemes of liability with the underlying goals of the tort system, while
simultaneously reflecting the honest expectations of the public.

1

Glover v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 551 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 2001).
Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004)
3
See id. (“The public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as
a full service provider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national
trend toward adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the
appropriate circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within
its walls.”).
4
See id.
5
See Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 152 (Ind. 1999) (“[U]nder
some circumstances, . . . written notice may not suffice if the patient had an inadequate opportunity to make an informed choice.”).
2
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II. EVOLUTION OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY
A. Early Hospital Immunity
Hospitals were traditionally immune from suit in tort under the
6
doctrine of charitable immunity. The charitable immunity doctrine
exempted charitable organizations from claims of tort liability
brought by the beneficiaries of the subject entity’s health care offer7
ings. Application of this general immunity was motivated in large
part by public perception of hospital organizations as caregivers insu8
lated from profit-based incentives. Standards of hospital operation
in the nineteenth century necessitated the exemption of hospitals
9
from tort suits brought by aggrieved patients. During that time, hospitals were known for “providing medical services to the lowest classes
10
of society, without regard to a patient’s ability to pay.” Given the
philanthropic motivation of such institutions, the application of tort
liability was thought to be inappropriate and inconsistent with socie11
tal interest.
In addition to policy-based considerations, the roots of charita12
ble immunity are also traceable to trust doctrine. Under this doctrine, charitable hospitals maintained insulation from suit in tort in
13
order to prevent the unintended diversion of trust funds. Specifically, it was understood that donations made for the benefit of the hos14
pital’s mission were held in public trust for the same purpose. It was
therefore observed that if such funds “could be used to compensate
persons for negligently inflicted injuries, the trust fund would be di-

6

ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION
539 (2d ed., 1988).
7
See Howard Levin, Hospital Vicarious Liability for Negligence by Independent Contractor Physicians: A New Rule for New Times, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2005).
8
See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 385 (1994).
9
Id.
10
Levin, supra note 7, at 1294.
11
See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 385 (“The main justification for charitable immunity was an implied waiver by patients who were receiving services free of
charge. But the implied waiver applied to paying as well as non-paying patients, and
to unconscious as well as conscious admittees to the hospital.”).
12
See Rhoda v. Aroostook Gen. Hosp., 226 A.2d 530, 532 (Me. 1967) (“The rationale of the immunity rule in favor of charitable institutions lay in the bounden duty of a public charity as a trustee to apply its funds in furtherance of its beneficent
purpose.”).
13
See id.
14
See, e.g., Fisher v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass’n, 73 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1952).
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verted to purposes never intended by the donor.” Because of these
concerns, courts generally immunized charitable hospitals from suit
to preserve the funds available for the hospitals’ use and to further
16
incentivize charitable donations in the healthcare field.
B. Demise of Charitable Immunity
Though well intentioned, even at the outset of its application,
the charitable immunity doctrine was criticized by some members of
17
the judiciary. In Georgetown College v. Hughes, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia condemned the liability exemption be18
cause of its inconsistency in application and confused premise. The
Georgetown College court criticized the immunity’s basis in trust doctrine—noting that “[n]o statistical evidence has been presented to
show that the mortality or crippling of charities has been greater in
states which impose full or partial liability than where complete or
19
substantially full immunity is given.”
Thus, the court determined
that the exposure of hospitals to liability in tort would not critically
20
obstruct the purpose of such charitable organizations.
Changes in the nature of hospital operations motivated further
21
criticism of the doctrine of charitable immunity. At its outset, the
doctrine of charitable immunity was premised on the understanding
that hospitals provided mere facilities within which individual physi22
cians administered actual care. Based on their separation from patient care, hospitals could not bear the responsibility for the wrong23
doings of acting physicians.
The gradual evolution of hospital offerings, however, significantly diminished the viability of such justifications. Specifically, the medical field witnessed a growing trend towards greater hospital involve24
ment in patient care. Consistent with this development, hospitals
began to adopt the role of “full-service healthcare providers” and rejected the notion that their role was limited to the provision of a
15

Id. at 669.
See, e.g., Downs v. Harper Hosp., 60 N.W. 42 (Mich. 1894).
17
See, e.g., Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 823.
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957).
22
Martin C. Williams & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 435 (1996).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 436.
16
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25

physical structure alone. The Court of Appeals of New York in Bing
26
v. Thunig accurately summarized this perceived evolution. Specifically, the court stated that
[t]he conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses,
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their
own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far
27
more than furnish facilities for treatment.

Judicial recognition of this reality gradually compelled the realization
that hospital accountability in tort was no longer inconsistent with so28
ciety’s interests.
Observation of this trend and newfound public image was moti29
vated further by hospital advertisements of offered services. Arguably, the increased presence of hospitals in patient care and the resulting commercialization of such practices significantly affected public
30
perception of hospitals as healthcare providers.
Commentators
have identified the consequences of this commercialization as including both a “loss of public sympathy” and a perceived expansion of le31
gal accountability.
The court in Bing determined that “the person who avails himself of ‘hospital facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure
him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own re32
sponsibility.” Thus, the Bing court rejected the application of charitable immunity and held that hospital liability was to be construed
under the same legal principles as those guiding general employer
33
liability. Following the signaled demise of charitable immunity in
Georgetown College and Bing, all states gradually rejected the doctrine
34
by the latter half of the twentieth century.

25

Id.
Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8–9.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 498 S.E.2d 408, 411 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1998); Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W. 2d 277, 278 (Wis. 1992).
30
Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 436.
31
Id.
32
Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
33
Id.
34
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 385.
26
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C. Contemporary Hospital Liability
The obvious consequence of charitable immunity’s erosion was
increased hospital liability for the negligent activity of hospital staff.
Consistent with most organizations, present analysis of hospital liability for actions in tort is necessarily dependent upon the employment
35
classification of subject staff members. Hospitals have traditionally
staffed their facilities with both direct employees and independent
36
contractors. In most cases, hospitals enter into employer-employee
37
relationships with nurses, technicians, and resident physicians. Beyond that, however, the vast majority of physicians regarded as “hospital staff” enjoy an independent contractor relationship with the
overseeing institution rather than an employer-employee relation38
ship. Hospitals will generally be liable for the tortious conduct of
39
their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Respondeat superior is a form of strict liability imputed to a principal
40
employer based on its legal relationship with the subject agent.
As a condition of employer liability under respondeat superior,
the court must find that an employee of the employer committed the
underlying tort, and that the tortious act occurred while the employ41
ee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. Within the
specific context of hospital operations, the plaintiff must first prove
42
his or her claim of medical malpractice against the acting physician.
Next, the plaintiff must set forth facts sufficient to prove the existence
of an agency relationship between the acting physician and the sub43
ject hospital. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions
of the treating physician that gave rise to medical malpractice were
44
committed within the scope of that employer-employee relationship.
Where a plaintiff succeeds in satisfying these elements of a
respondeat superior claim, the hospital will be held liable for the actions of treating employee-physicians without inquiry into any poten45
tial fault of the institution.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Levin, supra note 7, at 1295.
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 387.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The doctrine of respondeat superior, however, would not impose liability on hospitals for torts that independent contractor physi46
cians who practice within the same facility commit. Section 2 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an independent contractor
as one “who contracts with another to do something for him but who
is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the
47
undertaking.”
The primary difference between an employeremployee relationship and an independent contractor relationship is
the extent to which an employer-principal may exercise control over
48
the actions of the subject agent. In theory, the independent contractor relationship is predicated on autonomy in execution of the
contracted service and is largely removed from the principal’s con49
trolling influence.
Courts hold that principals may not be held liable for the negligent conduct of independent contractor agents because of the ab50
sence of control in this relationship. Within the specific context of
tort liability, courts have generally indicated that “it would be unfair
to hold a master liable for the conduct of another when the master
51
has no control over that conduct.”
Thus, principal non-liability
within this relationship is a consequence of the tort system’s underly52
ing purpose. The tort system assumes “that imposing liability on the
immediate tortfeasor will deter future actors from engaging in mal53
practice.” If one recognizes that an objective of imputing liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior concerns the influence of
prospective behavior, it logically follows that only those principals capable of exercising control over the tortfeasor should be subject to
liability. Hence, where hospitals lack control over their agents in
providing healthcare services, such institutions, in theory, should not
be liable for tortious conduct arising therefrom.
A hospital traditionally contracts for the services of independent
contractor physicians for the very purpose of insulating the institution from liability in tort: “[P]rincipals such as hospitals do not want
to be . . . liable for the torts of true independent contractors” as the
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. § 219 cmt. a.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957).
Id. § 220.
See id.
See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 148 (Ind. 1999).
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965)).
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 407.
Id.
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conduct of such agents is necessarily “beyond the control or the right
54
of control of the principal.” Given the potential for independentcontractor-based defenses to negligence suits, most hospitals expressly describe their relationships with physicians as those of principal
55
and independent contractor in their contracts for services. Based
on this common practice, hospitals should generally escape liability
for the misconduct of staff physicians. Despite their attempted insulation from liability, however, hospitals have been exposed to liability
for the actions of independent contractor physicians with increasing
56
frequency. As with the policy considerations motivating the judicial
erosion of charitable immunity, the public perception of hospitals as
complete-care institutions has influenced the relaxation of agency
principles concerning hospital liability for the tortious conduct of in57
dependent contractor physicians.
Increased adoption of exceptions to the independent contractor
liability rule of principal non-liability reflects the public recognition
that hospitals are “corporate entities capable of acting only through
58
human beings.” Recently, marketing tactics undertaken by the same
institutions have heavily influenced public perception of hospitals’
59
roles in healthcare provision. In reviewing the potential liability of a
hospital for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor physician, courts have observed that
[m]odern hospitals have spent billions on marketing to nurture
the image that they are full-care modern facilities. Billboards, television commercials and newspaper advertisements tell the public
to look to its local hospital for every manner of care, from the critical surgery and life-support required by a major accident to minor tissue repairs resulting from a friendly game of softball.60

Representations of “full-service offerings” create the impression that
61
hospitals provide medical services directly to the public. While such
54

Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 439.
Id.
56
See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 388.
57
Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) (“The public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service provider
of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward adopting
a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls.”).
58
Id. at 94 n.8 (quoting Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 93 (quoting Glover v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 551 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
61
Id.
55

MONTEFUSCO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 5:21 PM

COMMENT

1345

measures have likely resulted in increased business for the hospitaladvertiser, this “new role” of hospital service offerings has also result62
ed in “heightened exposure to lawsuits.” Courts have observed that
contemporary society generally relies on hospitals as institutions dur63
ing patient admission. Specifically, courts have recognized that “the
changing role of the hospital in society creates a likelihood that patients will look to the institution rather than the individual physician
64
for care.” Judicial treatment of hospital liability for the actions of its
contract physicians demonstrates that such social reliance is deserving of legal protection.
Owing to such considerations, judicial analysis of hospital liability has yielded two primary exceptions to the general rule of principal
non-liability. Courts have evaluated hospital liability through the lens
65
of either agency by estoppel or apparent agency. The following discussion seeks to analyze the efficacy of applying such tests to the relationship between hospitals and independent contractor physicians.
Analysis of these rules reveals that, though seemingly reflective of societal expectations, application of agency-based exceptions to the
general rule of principal non-liability presents a number of procedural and substantive challenges for the judiciary.
III. HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR PHYSICIANS
A. Agency by Estoppel
Following the complete erosion of hospital charitable immunity,
courts in various jurisdictions began imposing liability on hospitals
for the acts of independent contractor physicians operating within
66
the hospital facility under theories of agency by estoppel. Application of agency by estoppel is appropriate in circumstances in which,
as in the case of the relationship between a hospital and an independent contractor physician, no agency exists between the tortfea62

Id.
Id.
64
Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 94 n.8 (W. Va. 2004) (quoting Parker v. Freilich, 803 A.2d 738, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
65
See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Ak. 1987) (“Cases from other jurisdictions show a strong trend toward liability against hospitals that permit or encourage patients to believe that independent contractor/physicians are, in fact, authorized agents of the hospitals. These courts have held hospitals vicariously liable under
a doctrine labeled either ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ agency or ‘agency by estoppel.’”)
66
See, e.g., Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App.
1980).
63
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67

sor and the apparent principal.
Though designated “apparent
agency,” Section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes an estoppel-based exception to the general rule of principal
68
non-liability. The doctrine of agency by estoppel applies to those
situations in which a person or entity “represents that another is his
servant or other agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to
69
rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent.” Courts will impose liability under these circumstances because of the “appearance”
that the apparent agent was acting on behalf of the person or entity
70
at issue.
In order to satisfy the doctrine’s requirements, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he or she submitted to the care of an apparent
agent in response to an invitation extended by the apparent princi71
pal. Agency by estoppel “rests upon the theory that one has been
72
led to rely upon the appearance of agency to his detriment.” Fundamentally, this exception to the rule of principal non-liability depends on the existence of (1) representations made by an apparent
principal indicating the existence of an agency relationship between
the apparent principal and agent and (2) the plaintiff’s reliance
73
thereon. Where an individual patient is harmed as a result of his or
her reliance on the hospital’s representation, agency by estoppel creates a channel for recovery despite the hospital’s contractual insulation from liability.
Upon review of this test’s requirements, it appears that the challenging plaintiffs bear a significant burden in establishing hospital li74
ability. Yet contemporary application of this agency-based exception
has yielded waves of relaxation designed to impose hospital liability in
particular instances. That the judiciary has refrained from applying
this test with deserving rigor reflects the public recognition that, under certain circumstances, hospitals should be liable for the actions of
75
their independent contractor physicians. The following analysis of

67

Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 447.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. § 267 cmt. a.
72
Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 49 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ohio 1943).
73
Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 447.
74
Id. at 448 (citing Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 354 S.E.2d 632, 637 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987)).
75
Id.
68
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the judicial departure from the test’s explicit requirements illustrates
this purpose.
1.

Agency by Estoppel: Representation Requirement

Under the articulated terms of the test, a plaintiff must first
prove that the hospital represented that a plaintiff’s treating physi76
cian was a servant or another agent of the hospital. Proof of this
representation or “holding out” by the hospital must consist of acts
committed by the subject hospital that demonstrate its apparent rela77
tionship with the treating physicians. Comments to section 267 of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency specifically provide that “[t]he
mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party believes
to be the defendant’s servant is not sufficient to cause the apparent
78
master to be liable.” This element of agency by estoppel seeks to determine whether hospitals took actions sufficient to influence the
reasonable conclusion that a treating physician was an agent of the
79
hospital.
At first glance, it appears that the requirement of a representation or “holding out” on the part of the hospital stands as a signifi80
cant obstacle to plaintiff’s recovery. In order to satisfy the general
requirements of agency representation, courts should require a plaintiff to show that the hospital engaged in an “intentional misleading,
or an unreasonable or bad faith failure to speak after notice . . . caus81
ing a third party justifiably to rely upon the apparent agent.”
Despite this seemingly weighty standard, courts have more frequently loosened the plaintiff’s burden of proving active representa82
tions. Rather than requiring plaintiffs to set forth actual proof of
hospital representations, courts have actually presumed the hospital to
have “held itself out” as maintaining an agency relationship with
83
treating physicians. Justification for this broad-based easing in application wholly derives from “[t]he public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service provider of health
84
care.” As a consequence of this recognized social reliance, future
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a (1958).
Id.
Espalin v. Children’s Med. Ctr., 27 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 448.
Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 448.
Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004).
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review of the “representation” requirement will likely be minimal. In
future litigation, hospitals will generally be deemed to have represented the existence of an agency relationship with its independent
contract physicians unless it is proven otherwise.
Relaxation of the representation requirement reflects the beginnings of a result-oriented approach towards hospital liability. Presumptive findings of hospital representation have undoubtedly eased
the burden of persuasion that aggrieved plaintiffs carry, and, importantly, this practice suggests judicial approval of hospital liability
in certain circumstances. Indeed, this manner of treatment is also evident in the judiciary’s analysis of the test’s remaining requirements.
2.

Agency by Estoppel: Reliance Requirement

True application of agency by estoppel requires plaintiffs to
demonstrate both the existence of a hospital representation and their
85
reliance thereon.
Early application of the reliance requirement
within the context of agency by estoppel focused primarily upon det86
rimental reliance. Though courts initially adhered to this principle,
a majority of jurisdictions applying the agency-by-estoppel test to determine hospital liability have now replaced the requirement of det87
rimental reliance with mere “justifiable reliance.” This transition
indicates a judicial trend toward substantiating claims by aggrieved
patients against apparent principal hospitals. Importantly, courts
have permitted plaintiffs to satisfy the reliance requirement upon a
showing of reliance on the general reputation of a specific hospital rather than demanding proof of reliance upon specific acts of the insti88
tution.
Even accepting this relaxed standard, however, frequently occurring factual scenarios which give rise to medical malpractice have
forced courts to strain the bounds of this analysis. For example,
proof of reliance may be particularly difficult within the context of
emergency room admission. In a typical scenario, individuals requir85

Id. at 95.
See N. Trust Co. v. St. Francis Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1988) (“A third person cannot invoke the doctrine of apparent agency, thereby establishing rights against the principal, without detrimental reliance.”).
87
See Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 618 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 2005) (“Under
the stricter standard of § 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which embraces the theory of agency by estoppel, a showing of justifiable reliance by the injured
person upon the representations of the principal is required; whereas, reliance is
not a factor in § 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”).
88
Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Sisters of St. Mary, 637 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).
86
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ing immediate medical attention will likely call an ambulance, family
member, or close friend for transportation to the hospital. This situation presents two distinct questions for proof of reliance under any
standard. First, can it truly be said that a patient maintains a meaningful choice when determining which hospital he or she should visit
in an emergency scenario? Second, if the patient is relying on others
for care in transit to the hospital facility, can reliance on possible representations by a hospital be accurately attributed to the individual
patient?
Given the common occurrence of such scenarios, courts have often gone to great lengths to manipulate the reliance requirement of
estoppel in order to accommodate plaintiffs’ claims. The most illustrative example of judicial manipulation in answering the first question concerns instances of claimed negligence where the plaintiff was
not admitted to the hospital’s emergency room in a conscious state.
In Monti v. Silver Cross Hospital, the court encountered a factual scenario in which the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital’s emergency
89
room while unconscious. The plaintiff complained that the hospital’s failure “to have personnel available who were competent to diagnose and treat closed head injuries” caused her a permanent inju90
ry.
The court determined that the individuals acting on behalf of
the plaintiff “sought care from the hospital, not from a personal physician, and thus, a jury could find that they relied upon the fact that
complete emergency room care, including diagnostic testing and
91
support services, would be provided through the hospital staff.” The
court in Monti added further, “The same is true for all seriously ill or
badly injured patients, whether conscious or not, who come to a hos92
pital emergency room for emergency medical care.” The court determined that the facts of the dispute demonstrated plaintiff’s “im93
plied reliance” on the hospital.
Addressing the second question posed, courts have also permitted proof of reliance upon a showing of plaintiff’s reliance on oth94
ers. In Kane v. Doctors Hospital, the plaintiff sued the hospital at issue
95
for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor physician.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Kane v. Doctors Hosp., 706 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 72.
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It was undisputed that the plaintiff did not choose to be admitted to
96
the defendant hospital. Therefore, the hospital argued that because
the plaintiff did not choose to avail himself of the hospital’s services,
he could not have possibly relied on any representations made by the
97
same institution. The court in Kane rejected the defendant’s contention and held that, in general, relying on others to choose a particular medical facility for treatment was sufficient to establish reli98
ance.
Judicial analysis in Monti and Kane reflects current trends in finding ad hoc exceptions to the general requirement of reliance on hos99
pital representations.
Furthermore, these decisions illustrate the
general inapplicability of estoppel-based measures to determine hospital liability for negligent independent contractor physicians. The
judiciary has manipulated this test’s requirements to permit recovery
against hospitals in certain circumstances despite the hospitals’ contractual insulation from liability. This manipulation has been driven
by the public’s belief that hospitals directly administer care. Such
practices reflect the understanding that social reliance on hospitals in
their provision of medical treatment is sufficient to warrant judicial
protection. Notwithstanding the widespread relaxation of agency-byestoppel requirements, however, courts have increasingly resorted to
a less stringent—but similarly artificial—theory of hospital liability to
expand the breadth of this protection.
B. Apparent Agency
Courts have more recently transitioned their analysis to the doctrine of apparent agency in response to the obvious shortcomings of
100
agency by estoppel. Similar to the doctrine of agency by estoppel,
96

Id. at 72−73. Plaintiff was admitted to the defendant hospital at the direction
of his primary care physician. Id.
97
Id. at 74 (“[T]he Hospital argues that the trial court correctly granted its motion for summary judgment because the record established that (1) Kane knew Dr.
Song was not the Hospital’s employee; (2) neither the Hospital nor Dr. Song made
any representations to Kane that Dr. Song was an agent of the Hospital; (3) Kane did
not act reasonably in ascertaining Dr. Song’s employment status; and (4) Kane did
not rely on any representations by the Hospital when he sought radiological treatment.”).
98
Id. at 78.
99
See id.; Monti v. Silver Cross Hosp., 637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
100
It should be noted that, while apparent agency and agency by estoppel are distinct tests, courts frequently refer to both processes within the same analysis. See, e.g.,
Houghland v. Grant, 891 P.2d 563, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (“Although each theory
is based on a slightly different rationale, the two theories have been used interchangeably, resulting in misapplication of the law in some cases.”).
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apparent agency is an exception to the general rule that a principal is
immune from liability for the negligence of an independent contrac101
tor in the performance of contracted services.
Apparent agency
imposes liability on an apparent principal when the actions of that
entity mislead the public that a legal relationship exists between the
102
apparent principal and agent.
Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dictates the
103
parameters of this exception to the rule of principal non-liability.
Section 429 provides that a person or entity who contracts with an
agent “to perform services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer
or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by
104
the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services.”
Though similar in many respects, the principle difference between agency by estoppel under Section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and apparent agency under Section 429 of the Re105
statement (Second) of Torts concerns the requirement of reliance.
The court in Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hospital concluded that, in contrast to the express reliance requirement in Section 267, “[r]eliance is
an element of apparent authority under section[] . . . 429 only to the
extent that it is subsumed in the requirement that the person accepting an agent’s services do so in the ‘reasonable belief’ that the service
106
is being rendered in behalf of the principal.” Thus, under Section
429, a plaintiff must only demonstrate his or her reasonable belief ra107
ther than justifiable reliance to discharge the burden of proof. Additionally, Section 429 disposes of the specific representation re101

Basil v. Wolf, 935 A.2d 1154, 1172 (N.J. 2007).
Id.
103
See Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 851 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Jackson v. Power,
743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415
So. 2d 55, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Richmond Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361
S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga. 1987); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795
(Ill. 1993); Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Smith v. St.
Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279, 282 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Capan v. Divine Providence
Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 648–50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000) (citing Walker v. Winchester Mem’l Hosp., 585
F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (W.D. Va. 1984)) (“Numerous courts have relied on section 429
in decisions allowing a plaintiff to attempt to hold a hospital vicariously liable for a
purportedly independent physician’s negligent acts.”); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d
667, 672 (Wyo. 1988).
104
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1977).
105
958 A.2d 101, 106 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
106
Id.
107
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 206 P.3d 473, 478 (Idaho 2009).
102
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quirement necessary for a valid claim of agency by estoppel under
108
Section 267.
Within the context of hospital liability, courts have indicated
that “where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held
out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable
belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital,” the hospital
109
will be liable for the negligent conduct of that physician. Upon satisfaction of this test, courts hold hospitals liable for the negligent
misconduct of independent contractor physicians despite the hospi110
tals’ contractual insulation from liability.
Widespread adoption of apparent agency as a means of imputing liability was necessitated by the seemingly rigid obstacles that
111
agency by estoppel imposed. Yet, the underlying motivation for this
test derives from the same public policy considerations that led to the
112
discussed collapse of charitable immunity. The Court of Appeals of
Oregon accurately summarized this recognition in Jennison v. Provi113
dence St. Vincent Medical Center. There, the court concluded that the
general public “is unaware of and unconcerned with the technical
complexities and nuances surrounding the contractual and employment arrangements between the hospital and the various medical
114
personnel operating therein.”
Accordingly, contractual obstacles
should not limit the tort recovery of those “looking to the hospital”
115
for medical care.
The court’s declaration in Jennison is consistent with that of oth116
er jurisdictions.
In Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital, the New York
Court of Appeals criticized hospitals for benefitting from the appear108

Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 460.
Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
110
Id.
111
See Houghland v. Grant, 891 P.2d 563, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)(finding that,
upon comparison to apparent agency, “[a]gency by estoppel appears to have a stricter standard because it requires actual reliance upon the representations of the principal”)
112
See Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) (“The
public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service provider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward
adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate
circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls.”).
113
25 P.3d 358, 372 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
114
Id. at 367.
115
Id.
116
See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976).
109
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ance of their relationship with contract physicians while escaping liability by relying on “secret limitations . . . in a private contract be117
tween the hospital and the doctor.”
On the basis of such public
policy considerations, hospital liability for independent contractor
physicians has been pursued expansively under theories of apparent
118
agency.
Demonstration of hospital liability under apparent agency theories has proven to be comparatively easier than proof of the same un119
der agency by estoppel. Rather than bearing the burden of proving
an active representation by the subject hospital, plaintiffs under Section 429 must merely demonstrate that the hospital’s actions created
the reasonable belief that doctors who operate within the facility act120
ed on behalf of the hospital.
As the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division indicated in Estate of Cordero, plaintiffs need not establish an active misrepresentation to satisfy the hospital-action requirement under Section
121
429. Significantly, the court concluded that “[a] principal can manifest assent to a person’s action on its behalf by employing an independent contractor and sending that contractor to render perfor122
mance requested by another without disclosing that relationship.”
Thus, the court suggested that plaintiffs could satisfy the hospitalaction requirement of apparent agency by demonstrating the nature
and position of certain treating physicians who operate within the
123
hospital facility.
The Estate of Cordero court commented on the trend in other jurisdictions of courts finding reasonable belief where plaintiffs received “specialized care from medical professionals with whom they

117
Id.; see also Jessamy v. Parkmed Assocs., 761 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003).
118
See Sword v. NKC Hosp., 714 N.E.2d 142, 150 (Ind. 1999); Elizabeth Isbey,
Note, Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc. and the Emergence of Hospital Liability for Negligent
Independent-Contractor Physicians in North Carolina, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1127, 1137
(2008).
119
See Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 618 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 2005) (“Under
the stricter standard of § 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which embraces the theory of agency by estoppel, a showing of justifiable reliance by the injured
person upon the representations of the principal is required; whereas, reliance is
not a factor in § 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”).
120
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1977).
121
Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 958 A.2d 101, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008).
122
Id. at 106.
123
Id.
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124

[did] not have a prior or ongoing relationship.” The court further
added that in situations in which hospitals provide doctors to patients
without taking further action to “dispel the appearance” of an agency
relationship, “courts generally treat the hospital’s inaction as additional conduct manifesting the hospital’s assent to having the special125
ist care for the patient in its behalf.” In Estate of Cordero, the court
correctly identified the common trend within various jurisdictions of
focusing critically on the existence of a doctor’s prior relationship
126
with the patient to determine hospital liability. The judiciary’s emphasis on the existence of a prior relationship suggests that, where no
physician-patient relationship exists before hospital admission, the
hospital reasonably appears to be offering the medical service direct127
ly. The Estate of Cordero court indicated that this expectation is most
relevant within the context of hospitals’ providing specialized support
128
services. These specialized support services—anesthesia, pathology,
radiology, and emergency care—are typically provided to patients at
the direction of the hospital as an institution and as a direct conse129
quence of the patient’s immediate medical needs. Judicial scrutiny
of the hospital’s role in providing these services strongly suggests the
importance of considering specialized support services in future anal130
ysis.
124

Id. at 107.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Citron v. N. Dutchess Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding that when a plaintiff entered the hospital through the emergency room, the hospital’s employees called a number of physicians to treat the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
had no prior physician-patient relationship with any of the treating physicians, the
plaintiff “could properly assume that the treating doctors and staff of the hospital
were acting on behalf of the hospital”).
128
Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 109.
129
See e.g., Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 857 (Wis. 1988)
(“An individual who seeks care from a hospital itself, as opposed to care from his or
her personal physician, accepts care from the hospital in reliance upon the fact that
complete emergency room care—from blood testing to radiological readings to the
endless medical support services—will be provided by the hospital through its
staff.”).
130
See, e.g., Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (Cal. 1955) (holding that trial court
erred in taking issue of hospital’s ostensible agency for anesthesiologist from jury);
Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1162–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to the hospital’s liability for radiologist’s negligence when
radiology department was located within hospital grounds under doctrine of apparent agency); Sword v. NKC Hospital, 714 N.E.2d 142, 152–53 (Ind. 1999) (finding
issue of fact as to hospital’s liability for anesthesiologist); Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at
109 (finding that patients can reasonably assume that a hospital furnishes the care
rendered in its facility and holding hospital liable under doctrine of apparent au125
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Given the continued trend towards expanding hospital liability
for the negligence of independent contractor physicians, one can anticipate that, in almost all circumstances of future medical harm arising out of specialized support services, aggrieved patients will name
the hospital as an additional defendant. This conclusion is drawn on
the basis of consistent prior success:
[V]icarious liability suits have been successfully launched against
hospitals for the alleged negligence of anesthesiologists, radiologists, pathologists, and even occasionally against a surgeon whose
services the patient used because he was on hospital staff. . . . Under the doctrine of apparent authority, the fact that the medical
specialists performing these functions happen to have an independent-contractor rather than employment relationship with the
hospital will not insulate the hospital from vicarious liability for
131
their malpractice.

Indeed, the only genuine obstacle to patient recovery against
hospitals for negligence arising out of specialized support services is
132
the requirement that the patient’s belief be reasonable. Consistently with the general trend in hospital liability, however, courts have
shown no hesitation in massaging the reasonableness requirement to
accommodate factual circumstances giving rise to claims of medical
133
malpractice.
Courts have generally presumed that hospitals hold themselves
out as the providers of care unless they afford “notice to the patient
that [they are] not the provider[s] of care and that the care is provided by a physician who is an independent contractor and not sub134
ject to the control and supervision of the hospital.” In order to rebut the presumption of reasonableness, courts have required proof
establishing the hospital’s provision of “meaningful written notice”
delivered to the patient upon hospital admission that demonstrates
135
the “true” nature of its relationship with staff physicians.
Again, it
appears that the availability of a notice rebuttal would generally prethority for anesthesiologist’s negligence); Jennisort v. Providence St. Vincent Med.
Ctr., 25 P.3d 358, 367 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that radiological services are “integral to the overall medical services provided by the hospital”).
131
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 388.
132
Isbey, supra note 118, at 1146–47.
133
Id.
134
Sword v. NKC Hospital, 714 N.E.2d 142, 152 (Ind. 1999); see also Henry v. Flagstaff Med. Ctr., 132 P.3d 304, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Wishard Mem. Hosp. v. Kerr,
846 N.E.2d 1083, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 106 n.3;
Butler v. Domin, 15 P.3d 1189, 1196 (Mont. 2000).
135
Henry, 132 P.3d at 306; Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 152; Wishard Mem. Hosp., 846
N.E.2d at 1091; Butler, 15 P.3d at 1196.
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vent the imputation of liability to an apparent-principal hospital.
Due to the unique nature of most hospital admissions and the public
demands for hospitals’ accountability, however, courts have largely
136
disregarded hospitals’ attempts at liability disclaimer.
Judicial analysis of the “meaningfulness” requirement has generally resulted in three specific problems. First, courts are often inconsistent in their determinations of what constitutes “meaningful no137
tice.” Second, where individual patients are admitted to the hospihospital facility through emergency room entry, courts are not likely
to deem these individuals capable of reflecting on the notice provid138
ed. In these circumstances, courts will typically disregard hospitals’
attempts at notice, even where the form provided a sufficient dis139
claimer.
Finally, courts have increasingly disregarded liability dis140
Some courts have found that
claimers on public policy grounds.
hospitals should not be permitted to “give notice that operates as a
waiver of liability under any circumstances because of patients’ inability to make a reasonable choice as to their physician, whether an em141
ployee or independent contractor, once they arrive at the hospital.”
Theoretically, any demonstration of a patient’s actual knowledge
of the subject hospital’s legitimate non-servant relationship with a
142
physician should be sufficient to dispel claims of apparent agency.
This is so because apparent agency is predicated on a patient’s rea143
sonable belief that the physician is acting on behalf of the hospital.
Yet, courts have continually disregarded hospitals’ attempts to educate patients through the use of admission forms that indicate that

136

See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Henry, 132 P.3d 304; Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 94 (W. Va. 2004);.
137
Isbey, supra note 118, at 1146–47.
138
Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp. of San Bernardino, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 237 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (“Many courts have even concluded that prior notice may not be sufficient to avoid liability in an emergency room context, where an injured patient in
need of immediate medical care cannot be expected to understand or act upon that
information.”).
139
See id.
140
Sampson v. Baptist Mem. Hosp. Sys., 940 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. App. 1996).
141
Isbey, supra note 118, at 1146–47.
142
Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 358, 368 (Or. Ct. App.
2001). In order to satisfy the requirements for apparent agency, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that “a person in similar circumstances reasonably would have believed
that the physician who treated him or her was a hospital employee.” Id. A patient’s
actual knowledge that a physician was not a hospital employee would render that assumption unreasonable. Id.
143
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1977).
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treating physicians are not employees of the institution. While such
action should be adequate to preclude liability on the basis of apparent agency, courts have often found hospital notice to be artificial
and therefore insufficient to immunize the institution from the ac145
tions of its physicians.
Modern judicial treatment of this “notice”
issue is reflective of the judiciary’s reaction to societal expectations
compelling hospital accountability.
C. Judicial Error in Analysis
The above analysis reveals a common motivator driving judicial
apportionment of hospital liability generally, and, specifically, for the
negligent misconduct of independent contractor physicians operating within the hospital facility. Initial erosion of charitable immunity
was first compelled by the birth in public perception that “[p]resentday hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do
146
far more than furnish facilities for treatment.”
Upon the collapse
of total immunity, courts were placed in the difficult position of apportioning liability in a unique hospital environment. Given the pervasive nature of these relationships between hospitals and independent contractor physicians, courts applied commonly employed
exceptions to the independent contractor rule of principal immuni147
ty. While the inclination of courts to apply common agency excep144

See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972); Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 94 (W. Va. 2004).
145
See, e.g., Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 54
(Ohio 1994) (citing Steven R. Owens, Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital and the
Evolution of Hospital Liability: Wisconsin Adopts Apparent Agency, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1129,
1147(1990)) (finding that notice of independent contractor relationship will “rarely
provide the patient with the ability to choose at a meaningful time”).
The plaintiff, who by definition is injured and under stress, is relying
upon the hospital to provide the services that the hospital has held out
that it can provide. The plaintiff’s reliance upon the hospital’s competence has been demonstrated by her walking (or being wheeled) into
the emergency room. Simply informing her that some doctors and
staff have a different technical relationship with the hospital than the
one she expected does not lessen the reasonableness of her reliance
upon the hospital. Even if the patient understood the difference between an employee and an independent-contractor relationship, informing her of the nature of the relationship after she arrives is too
late. The purpose of any notice requirement is to impart knowledge
sufficient to enable the plaintiff to exercise an informed choice. The
signs suggested by the dissent are too little, too late.
Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 50 n.1.
146
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957).
147
See Sanchez v. Mary Wash. Hosp., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 331, 335 (Va. 2005) (“In virtually all of these cases imposing vicarious liability, the particular jurisdiction in-
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tions was expected, the judiciary failed to account for the unique environment upon which such theories would fall. Clearly, agency-byestoppel and apparent-agency theories, though readily applicable to
commercial encounters, are poorly suited to guide liability imputation in hospital settings.
Judicial manipulation of these guidelines reflects the very public
148
policy that compelled the erosion of charitable immunity. The Supreme Court of Ohio accurately identified this driving recognition in
149
Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Center.
The Clark court
stated that “[t]he public, in looking to the hospital to provide such
care, is unaware of and unconcerned with the technical complexities
and nuances surrounding the contractual and employment arrangements between the hospital and various medical personnel operating
150
therein.”
The court then concluded that “[p]ublic policy dictates
that the public has every right to assume and expect that the hospital
151
is the medical provider it purports to be.” While the reality of this
expectation is undoubted, the process by which courts have attempted to advance the same has ultimately hindered its purpose.
Plainly, the overriding significance of the public’s concept of the
contemporary hospital image has led courts to employ a resultoriented approach to determining hospital liability. Yet, the judiciary
has employed a generally inappropriate means to achieve this end.
Though well-intentioned and accurately reflective of societal expectations, the modern practice of attributing hospital liability is inherently flawed. The consequences of this inconsistency are plainly evident

volved had already adopted the theory of apparent agency or agency by estoppel as a
basis of tort liability when the jurisdiction used the theory to hold a hospital vicariously liable for the negligent medical care rendered by an . . . independent contractor.”).
148
Compare Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 9 (noting that “today’s hospital is quite different
from its predecessor of long ago; it receives wide community support, employs a
large number of people and necessarily operates its plant in businesslike fashion” in
its decision to abandon charitable immunity), with Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53 (“With
hospitals now being complex full-service institutions, the emergency room has become the community medical center, serving as the portal of entry to the myriad of
services available at the hospital. As an industry, hospitals spend enormous amounts
of money advertising in an effort to compete with each other for the health care dollar, thereby inducing the public to rely on them in their time of medical need. The
public, in looking to the hospital to provide such care, is unaware of and unconcerned with the technical complexities and nuances surrounding the contractual and
employment arrangements between the hospital and the various medical personnel
operating therein.”).
149
Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53.
150
Id.
151
Id.
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in the judiciary’s common relaxation and manipulation of tests em152
ployed to impute hospital liability.
Judicial dedication to theories
of agency by estoppel and apparent agency has resulted in widespread artificiality in application. Simply stated, courts are not being
true to the tests that they purport to rely on.
While the misapplication of these processes is certainly deserving
of criticism, the true consequence of this practice runs deeper than
being a mere procedural error. Indeed, continued application of
agency-by-estoppel and apparent-agency theories to the hospital setting is inconsistent with the basic principles of liability imputation.
Courts should reject this practice because it fails to advance the tort
153
system’s “crucial objective” of preventing future harm.
In addition to victim compensation, imputation of liability in
tort should aim to address the underlying departure from standards
154
of care and prevent an incident’s reoccurrence.
This rationale
serves as the very basis of principal non-liability and the independent155
contractor rule. As the principal in a true independent contractor
relationship cannot, by definition, exert control over the acting
agent, the principal is deemed poorly suited to prevent agent ne156
glect.
Accordingly, on the basis of this relationship, courts have
157
generally declined to impute liability to the removed principal.
The nature of this premise plainly illustrates the frailty of modern judicial analysis of hospital liability for the tortious conduct of independent contractor physicians. By holding hospitals liable under
152

See, e.g., Kane v. Doctors Hosp., 706 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Monti v.
Silver Cross Hosp., 637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
153
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 407; see also Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders,
Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1175 (Conn. 2006); Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 118
(Tex. 2003).
154
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 407.
155
Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53. The court in Clark indicated that vicarious liability will
be imposed upon the relationship of master-servant, but not on the employer of and
independent contractor. Id. In making this determination, the court must find that
“the employer retain[ed] control, or the right to control, the mode and manner of
doing the work contracted for.” Id. (citing Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 16 N.E.2d
447 (Ohio 1938)).
156
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965).
157
See id. § 409 cmt. a (“The general rule stated in this Section, as to the
nonliability of an employer for physical harm caused to another by the act or omission of an independent contractor, was the original common law rule. The explanation for it most commonly given is that, since the employer has no power of control
over the manner in which the work is to be done by the contractor, it is to be regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and bearing and
distributing it.”).
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theories of agency by estoppel or apparent agency, courts are attributing liability on the basis of exceptions to the general independentcontractor rule of principal non-liability. In so doing, however,
courts are still honoring the existence of the independent contractor
relationship between the hospital and treating physician. Implicit in
the acceptance of this relationship is the understanding that hospitals
do not maintain control, or capability to control, the independent
contractor physicians.
Judicial acknowledgement of hospital liability as an exception to
principal non-liability incentivizes hospitals to emphasize more outwardly their lack of control over physicians operating within hospital
facilities so that they can insulate themselves from liability more effectively. This contemplated reaction is most clearly witnessed in the
modern practice of hospitals who disclaim liability through the use of
admission forms indicating that treating physicians are independent
contractors and not employees of the hospital. Yet, the judiciary’s increasing disregard for such disclaimers suggests that hospitals will be
held liable, not on the basis of exercised control, but rather as a result of the publicly recognized appearance that hospitals are necessary full-service healthcare facilities.
The consequence of this inconsistency between analysis and motivation is the imputation of liability to an entity that is still acknowledged to be incapable of controlling the tortfeasor at issue. What is
more, that same entity maintains an incentive to further distance itself from the underlying actor. By disincentivizing hospital involvement in medical practice, the judiciary has arguably prevented hospitals from realizing their potential as organizations to prevent future
harm. This practice is inconsistent with principles of liability due to
the fact that hospitals do not maintain additional incentives to implement corrective measures, which are intended to prevent the re158
occurrence of an independent contractor physician’s negligent act.
Rather, hospitals that are held liable under apparent agency or agency by estoppel will have an incentive to take actions to remove themselves from the exception and restore their anticipated exemption
from suit under the independent contractor rule. Though compensating aggrieved patients individually, this practice of imputation fails
to serve the underlying purpose of liability—that of injury prevention.

158
Significantly, if it was determined that the hospital did in fact exercise control
over a particular physician, the hospital would be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.

MONTEFUSCO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 5:21 PM

COMMENT

1361

IV. NONDELEGABLE DUTY
The judiciary has erred in its continued adherence to feigned
agency principles. Given the leniency of present standards, plaintiffs
will face no legitimate obstacles in demonstrating hospital liability
upon proof of the underlying tort. This Comment therefore assumes
that, going forward, hospitals will be held liable for the actions of independent contractor physicians in certain circumstances. In light of
that assumption, this Comment proposes a solution to the abovediscussed error in analysis. This Comment argues for the imposition
of a nondelegable duty on hospitals to provide specialized support
services to the general public.
The doctrine of non-delegable duty is a legal theory under which
principals maintain primary responsibility for the negligent conduct
of an independent contractor despite having delegated performance
159
to another agent.
The South Carolina Supreme Court explained
the doctrine in Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center as a strict liability concept whereby “[a] person may delegate a duty to an independent contractor, but if the independent contractor breaches that
duty by acting negligently or improperly, the delegating person re160
mains liable for that breach.” The court noted further that “[i]t is
the liability, not the duty, that is not delegable. The party which owes
the nondelegable duty is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of
161
the independent contractor.”
Application of this doctrine depends in large part on the social
importance attached to the underlying activity that gave rise to the
162
action in tort.
Significantly, scholars have concluded that “[i]t is
difficult to suggest any criterion by which the nondelegable character
of such duties may be determined, other than the conclusion that the
responsibility is so important to the community that the employer
163
should not be permitted to transfer it to another.” Duties presently
considered to be nondelegable include the duty of a common carrier
to transport passengers safely, of a municipality to keep its streets in
good repair, of a landlord to maintain common spaces, and of a rail164
road to properly maintain its tracks and safe crossings. Though fac159

Renown Health, Inc. v. Vanderford, 235 P.3d 614, 616 (Nev. 2010).
533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000).
161
Id.
162
Marek v. Prof’l Health Servs., Inc., 432 A.2d 538, 546 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981).
163
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 71 at
511–12 (5th ed. 1984).
164
Id.
160
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tually dissimilar, these accepted nondelegable duties are considered
so important to the community that the responsibility for their execu165
tion cannot be transferred to another entity.
Courts should extend the doctrine of nondelegable duty to hospital operations for the same reason. The importance of hospital accountability has fueled the evolution of hospital liability since the ini166
tial demise of charitable immunity.
Following the erosion of this
immunity, public expectations of hospitals as direct caregivers have
driven courts’ decisionmaking and has lead courts to validate these
167
public beliefs in its near assurance of legal protection. This observation alone demonstrates that the overriding importance of hospital
operations is sufficient to warrant the application of a nondelegable
duty.
Yet, in addition to that of the judiciary, legislative, and executive
focus on hospital responsibility for its provision of healthcare services
has also demonstrated the social importance of the provision of such
services. Specifically, hospitals participating in Medicare must com168
ply with a wide range of federal regulations. Hospitals are required
to establish a program for “quality assessment” and “performance
169
improvement.” Under the terms of this program, the participating
hospital must ensure that it “focuses on indicators related to improved health outcomes and the prevention and reduction of medi170
cal errors.” By the very terms of this regulation, hospitals are compelled to take affirmative measures towards the improvement of
171
patient care. These federal regulations demonstrate the government’s interest in requiring hospitals to act for the benefit of its patients in particular circumstances.
In addition to the efforts taken by the federal legislature, some
courts have devised additional means for ensuring patient safety during hospital stays. Notably, certain jurisdictions have imposed an independent duty upon hospitals to monitor the practice and care of
all physicians, which is actionable under the doctrine of negligent
165

See id.
See Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) (“The
public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service provider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward
adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate
circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls.”).
167
See id.
168
42 C.F.R. § 482.1(a)(1)(i) (2011).
169
Id. § 482.21.
170
Id.
171
Id.
166
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credentialing. Under this doctrine, courts impose a duty on hospitals to ensure patient safety through the monitoring of physician
173
practice within the hospital facility.
In Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this theory of
liability forces on a hospital “a direct and independent responsibility
to its patients . . . to take reasonable steps to (1) insure that its medical staff is qualified for the privileges granted and/or (2) to evaluate
174
the care provided.” Importantly, the court in Johnson “pointed out
that the physician’s status was irrelevant, explaining that the hospital
was liable under the duty it owed to the plaintiff itself, not for the
breach of duty by the physician under the theory of respondeat supe175
rior.”
Thus, the concept of negligent credentialing further illustrates the social importance attached to the role of hospitals in delivering patient care.
On the basis of this recognition, courts should employ an analysis more true to its underlying motivation when apportioning liability
for the medical malpractice of independent contractor physicians.
Where, as here, relevant public policy considerations are the driving
force behind hospital liability, courts should be honest about their
motivation and hold that societal expectations of hospital accountability are “so important to the community that the employer should
176
not be permitted to transfer it to another.”
Significantly,
nondelegation should apply to those contexts of medical malpractice
in which the public policy commanding hospital liability is most
strong.
Courts have continually relied on the public perception “of the
hospital as a health care facility responsible for the quality of medical
care and treatment rendered” as a reason to manipulate established
177
guidelines to apportion fault-based liability.
This manipulation is
most evident where a hospital is named as a defendant for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor physician who did not es-

172

See, e.g., Carter v. Hucks-Folliss, 505 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
See, e.g., Fletcher v. S. Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003); Elam v. Coll.
Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166
(Wash. 1984); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
174
Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 165.
175
Whitney Foster, Health Law—Negligent Credentialing and You: What Happens
When Hospitals Fail to Monitor Physicians, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 321, 324
(2009).
176
PROSSER ET AL., supra note 163, at § 71, at 511–12.
177
Id.
173
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178

tablish a relationship with the patient prior to admission. The Appellate Division of New Jersey, in Estate of Cordero, commented on the
fact that, in a prior decision, “the court found conduct manifesting
agency primarily because of the position in which the hospital placed
179
the doctors.”
The court in Estate of Cordero further added that
“[c]ourts of other jurisdictions take [this] approach when a hospital
has established and staffed facilities or departments through which
patients receive specialized care from medical professionals with
180
whom they do not have a prior or ongoing relationship.”
Thus, in
the absence of a prior or ongoing physician-patient relationship,
courts will likely conclude that the hospital has manifested its assent
to an agency relationship with the treating independent contractor
181
physician. Courts have strained to hold hospitals liable in these situations despite the express limitations of the tests applied because, in
circumstances where no prior relationship exists, it reasonably ap182
pears that the hospital is providing the services at issue. Continued
judicial focus on the existence of a prior relationship suggests its
functional significance in apportioning liability.
But the presence or absence of a prior relationship should not
alone serve as the standard upon which a nondelegable duty will be
imposed. Determination of this relationship would necessarily involve a fact-based inquiry into the circumstances of a plaintiff’s hospital entry. Where, as in this Comment, the purpose of the proposed
change in analysis is to force responsibility on an entity, the vehicle
employed should be as brightline as possible. Therefore, the object
of non-delegation should be the type of medical service provided
within the hospital facility. The Illinois Supreme Court recapitulated
the importance of this benchmark in York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
183
Luke’s Medical Center. The court in York stated, “If a patient does select a particular physician to perform certain procedures within the
hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a patient nevertheless
still reasonably relies upon the hospital to provide the remainder of
178

See Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp. 958 A.2d 101, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008); Citron v. N. Dutchess Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
179
Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 109.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Citron, 198 A.D.2d at 620 (finding that where a plaintiff entered the hospital
through the emergency room, the hospital’s employees called a number of physicians to treat the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had no prior physician-patient relationship with any of the treating physicians, the plaintiff “could properly assume that the
treating doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on behalf of the hospital”).
183
854 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. 2006).
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the support services necessary to complete the patient’s treatment.”
Through this acknowledgement, the court in York implicitly recognized that this benchmark applies to both methods of patient admission—emergency room and pre-arranged surgical entry. In so doing,
the court in York suggested that in nearly all cases of patient treatment the hospital must provide medical services incidental to the
185
primary reason for admission.
Thus, this Comment argues that courts should impose a
nondelegable duty on hospitals for the offering of specialized support
services to the general public. For the purposes of this discussion,
specialized support services are defined to include emergency room
care, radiology, pathology, and anesthesia. In almost all cases, the
range of treating physicians with whom patients do not maintain a
prior relationship will be coextensive with that range of physicians
charged with the responsibility of providing specialized support services within the hospital facility. Therefore, courts utilizing this
standard would impose liability on hospitals in the circumstances in
which the judiciary has found public policy to be most compelling;
but they will do so by using a brightline rule, which will be sufficient
to accurately guide subject hospitals.
The imposition of a nondelegable duty to hospitals that provide
specialized support services to the general public would achieve the
same result as that desired under the strained agency-by-estoppel and
apparent-agency theories. Yet, it will do so in a manner true to the
analysis employed and more outwardly reflective of underlying motivation. The need for patient protection and the patients’ reliance on
hospital offerings have forced this evolution in hospital liability. This
proposed change is necessary because it stands to protect such interests through the tort system’s natural process.
Indeed, it is only through the adoption of a nondelegable duty
that this system might operate as desired and decrease the likelihood
of future harm. By forcing hospitals to accept liability in certain instances, such institutions are more likely to leverage their strengths as
organizations in directly overseeing certain aspects of patient care.
Through this oversight, hospitals would be permitted to freely consider aggregate data arising out of institution-wide patient interaction
and more accurately gauge trends in performance. The application
of a nondelegable duty directly incentivizes such practices because it

184
185

Id. at 670.
Id.
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is only through the avoidance of harm that such institutions might
186
escape liability.
Though its purpose is broad, the effect of this change would
necessarily be precise. By limiting a hospital’s nondelegation to specialized support services, courts will effectively target only those hospital-physician relationships that create the appearance of an agency
relationship. This change in doctrine would specifically target specialized support services because courts recognize that these services
as offered by the hospital rather than rendered through an inde187
pendent contractor physician.
The court in Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Bonner accurately identified this understanding by observing
that “anesthesiologists, pathologists, radiologists, and emergency
room physicians all share the common characteristic of being supplied through the hospital rather than being selected by the pa188
tient.”
Furthermore, these fields of medical offerings have been
traditionally characterized as “integral services” provided within the
189
hospital facility. On the basis of this categorization, courts have distinguished radiology, pathology, anesthesia, and emergency room
190
services from medical fields that are traditionally private. In each of
these specialized fields of practice, the treating physician does not
191
maintain a relationship with the patient prior to admission. Thus,
under this theory of imputation, a hospital will only be held liable for
those services that it reasonably appears to offer.
Courts have more frequently applied theories of nondelegation
to some individual components of specialized support services. Significantly, courts in the states of Alaska, Florida, and New York have
applied the theory of non-delegable duty when construing a hospi192
tal’s role in providing medical care in its emergency room facility.
In Jackson v. Power, the Supreme Court of Alaska emphasized the
commercialization of modern medicine and its resulting impact on
186

See, e.g., Simmons, 341 S.C. at 42 (“A person may delegate a duty to an independent contractor, but if the independent contractor breaches that duty by acting
negligently or improperly, the delegating person remains liable for that breach. It
actually is the liability, not the duty, that is not delegable. The party which owes the
nondelegable duty is vicariously liable for negligent acts of the independent contractor.”)
187
Doctors Hosp. v. Bonner, 392 S.E.2d 897, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Paintsville
Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ky. 1985).
188
Doctors Hosp., 392 S.E.2d at 908.
189
Jones v. Salem Hosp., 762 P.2d 303, 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
190
Id.
191
Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985).
192
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 318 (S.C. 2000).
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the public perception of hospitals as institutions. As a consequence
of this change in expectation, the court concluded that the imposition of a nondelegable duty on hospitals for their provision of emergency room services was “consonant with the public perception of the
hospital as a multifaceted health care facility responsible for the qual194
ity of medical care and treatment rendered.” The court held that,
with respect to emergency room offerings, “[i]t is the hospital’s duty
to provide the physician, which it may do through any means at its
disposal. The means employed, however, will not change the fact
that the hospital will be responsible for the care rendered by physi195
cians it has a duty to provide.”
Some courts have also adopted the doctrine of nondelegable du196
ty for the provision of anesthesia to admitted patients.
In Wax v.
Tenet Health Sytem. Hospitals, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Florida concluded that, on the basis of statutory regulation of anesthesia within
the state of Florida, the subject hospital had a nondelegable duty to
197
provide anesthesia in a reasonably safe fashion.
Commenting on
the court’s decision in Wax, the court in Kristensen-Kepler v. Cooney
found that the “imposition of a non-delegable duty under such cir198
The court concluded that, in situations
cumstances makes sense.”
in which a hospital is obligated to provide medical services and directs a physician to perform the same, the offering hospital should
bear a nondelegable duty to provide that service in a non-negligent
199
manner. The court’s recognition that the patient “has little, if any,
control over who administers” medical care served as the basis for its
200
conclusion.
Although no court has imposed a nondelegable duty on a hospital to provide all specialized support services, Chief Judge Altenbernd
of the Florida District Court of Appeals advanced this argument in his
201
concurrence to the majority’s opinion in Roessler v. Novak. Specifically, Chief Judge Altenbernd concluded that

193

743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987).
Id.
195
Id.
196
See, e.g., Wax v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
197
Id. at 9.
198
39 So. 3d 518, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
858 So. 2d 1158, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring).
194
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[g]iven modern marketing approaches in which hospitals aggressively advertise the quality and safety of the services provided within their hospitals, it is quite arguable that hospitals should have a
nondelegable duty to provide adequate radiology departments,
pathology laboratories, emergency rooms, and other professional
services necessary to the ordinary and usual functioning of the
202
hospital.

Chief Judge Altenbernd justified the imposition of a duty on the
grounds that, within the context of those service offerings, “the patient does not usually have the option to pick among several independent contractors at the hospital and has little ability to negotiate
203
and bargain.”
Since the decision in Roessler, a number of courts
have expressed their approval of Judge Altenbernd’s concurring
204
opinion.
The imposition of a nondelegable duty on hospitals to provide
specialized support services within their facilities should not disrupt
present methods of talent acquisition. Under this doctrine, hospitals
would still be permitted to engage in the current practice of contract205
ing for the services of medical doctors with physician groups. Such
hiring practices would not be disturbed by this Comment’s argument.
Rather, the goal of this proposal is to change the subject hospital’s
expectations of that contractual arrangement.
V. CONCLUSION
As the above analysis plainly demonstrates, courts have increasingly held hospitals liable for the actions of independent contractor
physicians despite the hospitals’ legitimate contractual insulation
from liability. This Comment concedes that, though generally inconsistent, this practice has advanced a major objective of the tort system.
By holding hospitals liable for the negligent conduct of independent
contractor physicians, the courts have undoubtedly facilitated an alternate and potentially more reliable mechanism for compensation
of aggrieved patients. In so doing, however, courts have ignored the
202

Id.
Id.
204
Kristensen-Kepler, 39 So. 3d 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Wax v. Tenet Health
Sys. Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
205
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000) (“A person may delegate a duty to an independent contractor, but if the independent contractor breaches that duty by acting negligently or improperly, the delegating person
remains liable for that breach. It actually is the liability, not the duty, that is not delegable. The party which owes the nondelegable duty is vicariously liable for negligent
acts of the independent contractor.”).
203
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most critical purpose of the tort system—that of injury prevention.
Within this very context, courts have demonstrated that, the judiciary
has overlooked the tort system’s inherent desire to “give parties with
crucial duties a keen incentive to do everything possible to avoid violating those duties” by holding hospitals liable under exceptions to the
206
general rule of non-liability. This Comment recommends adopting
principles of nondelegation for hospital offerings specialized support
services to rectify this omission.
The most significant consequence of adopting non-delegation in
this context lies within the theory’s harmony with the doctrinal principles of liability. By eliminating the possibility of hospital nonliability, hospitals will lose incentive to distance themselves from certain aspects of care delivery. This is because, under theories of
nondelegation, hospitals would not be permitted to escape liability
on the basis of a legitimate appearance of true independent contractor relationships. In mandating accountability of hospitals in their
provision of specialized support services, courts may motivate an entity to prevent instances of future neglect more adequately.

206

Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 321.

